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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. While developing its own 
research projects, the Centre works in close relation with the four departments 
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Markets have remained sceptical about the ECB’s recent and likely future 
performance mainly for two reasons: Market participants have difficulties 
understanding the ECB’s monetary policy strategy, and the ECB lacks a track record 
in maintaining price stability that could dispel market scepticism. What could the 
ECB do to enhance its credibility? First and foremost, they should take no risk with 
regard to inflation. Any monetary policy mistake causing a breach of the ECB’s 
inflation target will be especially costly during the first few years of the ECB's 
operation as it would represent a set-back to quickly establishing a good track record 
in maintaining price stability. Second, the ECB will need to continue its efforts at 
explaining its monetary policy strategy more clearly to the markets. The widely 
understood and accepted Taylor Rule could be used to make the ECB’s strategy more 
transparent.
Paper presented at the Seminar Series on European Monetary Integration at the Robert Schuman 






















































































































































































Central banks and financial markets need each other. For instance, commercial 
banks use the central bank as a source for liquidity, and financial markets look 
to the central banks for signals on the direction of interest rate developments. At 
the same time, central banks need the banking systems and financial markets as 
an important part of the transmission mechanism to influence economic activity 
and in the event prices. But central banks and financial markets also 
continuously struggle for dominance in their relationship. Central banks want to 
guide market rates by determining the costs of central bank liquidity and 
influencing market psychology. Financial markets, on the other hand, 
permanently scrutinise central banks as to their ability to maintain price stability 
and rate their performance by the shape of the bond market yield curves and the 
external value of the currencies they issue. It is in the interest of central banks to 
receive good marks from the markets because high credibility reduces the 
inflation risk premium on interest rates and increases the responsiveness of the 
economy to changes in the stance of monetary policy. Since financial markets 
hate uncertainty and surprises, they value highly clarity and consistency in 
central bank policy. But above all they are impressed by a successful track 
record in the maintenance of price stability.
How does the ECB fare in the view of financial markets? In the following 
we argue that markets have remained sceptical about the ECB’s likely future 
performance mainly for two reasons: Market participants have difficulties 
understanding the ECB’s monetary policy strategy, and the ECB lacks a track 
record in maintaining price stability that could dispel market scepticism. What 
could the ECB do to enhance its credibility? First and foremost, they should take 
no risk with regard to inflation. Any monetary policy mistake causing a breach 
of the ECB’s inflation target will be especially costly during the first few years 
of the ECB’s operation as it would represent a set-back to quickly establishing a 
good track record in maintaining price stability. Second, the ECB will need to 
^continue its efforts at explaining its monetary policy strategy more clearly to the 
markets. The widely understood and accepted Taylor Rule could be used to 
make the ECB’s strategy more transparent.
THE MARKET VIEW OF THE ECB
Although the ECB has been dubbed "the most independent central bank of the 
world" and European Monetary Union had a virtually flawless start, many 
financial market participants still seem to doubt whether the central bank indeed 
can fulfil its mandate of maintaining price stability. In the course of the year, 



























































































euro weakened significantly during the first half of the year. The main reason for 
the depreciation was of course market participants’ grim economic outlook for 
Euroland and the associated expectations for interest rate declines at the 
beginning of the year. In addition, concerns about the political stability in 
Europe during the time of the Kosovo campaign also weighed on the euro. 
However, these factors alone are not sufficient to explain the performance of the 
single European currency. The fact that the euro benefited only little from the 
end of the hostilities in the former Yugoslavia and reacted only moderately to 
the rebound in growth expectations for the euro-zone suggests that international 
investors have demanded a significant risk premium for holding euros. This 
becomes even more evident when we regard the euro together with the 
performance of the bond market.
Since the beginning of the year, the Euroland yield curve (defined here as the 
weighted average of Euroland 10-year bond yields minus 3-month Euribor rates) 
has steepened by 180 basis points. Part of the steepening was probably caused 
by the improvement of economic prospects for Euroland and the world at large 
after excessive gloom and worries about deflation at the beginning of the year. 
However, the shift in the yield curve coincided with the weakening of the euro, 
which tends to argue against rising growth expectations primarily causing the 
rise in long-term bond yields. Rather, the desire to be compensated for an 
increased risk appears to have added to investors’ demands of higher yields on 
Euroland bonds.
Perhaps the most visible evidence for the emergence of a risk premium on 
Euroland bonds can be found in the development of the spread between nominal 
and index-linked French government bonds with a ten year maturity (OAT’s and 
OATi’s). In a perfect world, the returns on investments in these bonds are the 
same when the annual average inflation rate during the maturity of the bonds is 
identical to the spread in yields (hence the latter is generally known as the 




























































































inflation and liquidity risk premia. Nominal bond yields may include an inflation 
risk premium - which tends to widen the spread - while inflation-indexed bonds 
may include a liquidity risk premium because of the generally smaller market 
size - which tends to narrow the spread. Given that more than one factor is likely 
to account for the spread, it is difficult to infer from it on the absolute size of the 
inflation risk premium. But some tentative conclusions on the change in the 
inflation risk premium can be drawn when there is reason to believe that the 
other factors influencing the yield spread have remained unchanged.
Since the beginning of the year, the liquidity of OATi’s has not changed 
significantly so that we can assume the liquidity risk premium to have remained 
constant. Moreover, consensus forecasts for inflation have increased only little. 
At the end of 1998, consensus forecasts saw French inflation at 0.9% in 1999. 
By September this year, analysts had revised down their forecasts for 1999 to 
0.6%, but were then expecting an acceleration of consumer price inflation to 
1.1% in 2000. Assuming that changes in the one-year-ahead inflation forecast 
are a rough approximation for changes in forecasts of trend inflation, we may 
conclude that inflation expectations increased by about 20 basis points during 
the first 9 months of this year. Between the introduction of the OATi’s last 
September and the end of January of this year, the yield spread to nominal 
OAT’s eased from 120 basis points to 70 basis points. Since then it has widened 
again to 180 basis points in September. Based upon the above considerations, 
perhaps about 90 basis points of the total increase of 110 basis points could be 
ascribed to the increase of an inflation risk premium.
An especially interesting episode was the development of the spread in 
April and May. At the end of March, the spread had widened to 110 basis points 
from the 70 basis points achieved in January. Following the ECB’s unexpectedly 
large rate cut on April 8, the yield spread rose to about 125 basis points by the 
end of April / beginning of May. The widening of the spread occurred through a 




























































































result of significant demand for inflation indexed bonds meeting rather limited 
supply, which pushed up the price of OATi’s. Thus, it seems that the ECB’s first 
interest rate move added to the general market uneasiness about monetary policy 
in EMU.
WHY ISN’T THE ECB RATED MORE HIGHLY BY THE MARKET?
In view of the ECB’s institutional set-up committing the central bank to the 
maintenance of price stability and guaranteeing its independence from political 
pressure it may seem odd that financial markets would harbour doubts about its 
ability to keep inflation low. However, against this stands the ECB’s task of 
conducting a single monetary policy for a politically fragmented and 
economically diverse economic area, and a monetary policy strategy that needs 
to take account of the poor quality of data and a high degree of uncertainty about 
the monetary transmission mechanism. Many financial market participants 
harbour doubts as to whether EMU will really work and find the ECB’s 
behaviour difficult to judge. Moreover, on the way to EMU politicians bent the 
convergence criteria and quarrelled over the selection of the ECB’s first 
president. This has rekindled fears about the ECB’s ability to resist political 
interference.
In the discussions of the Maastricht Treaty, even Chancellor Kohl - a 
fervent supporter of EMU and one of its fathers - thought that monetary union 
would eventually need to be complemented by political union to make it 
durable. Many economists agreed, pointing to the need for a strong central 
budget exerting an equilibrating influence on economic regions of different 
strength and in an area of low labour mobility due to language and cultural 
barriers. However, it soon became clear that agreement on political union could 
not be reached and the idea was silently buried. Without political union, 
however, monetary union of at most a few European core countries with proven 
stable exchange rate links only seemed feasible. This view was shattered when 
in 1996-97 a large number of countries embarked upon a race to meet the entry 
criteria for EMU and all but one, Greece, managed to qualify. The group of 
eleven countries, which then in May 1998 committed itself to enter EMU in 
1999, could hardly be seen as representing an optimal currency area: it included 
countries on different economic cycles with different underlying growth rates 
and varying degrees of economic flexibility. The view held widely before 1998 
especially among market participants in New York and London that EMU 





























































































On the road to EMU, politics played an important role. Seemingly firmly 
agreed criteria for the selection of countries were seriously bent for political 
reasons. Thus, only few participants had debt ratios of less than 60% (and 
Germany’s ratio was even rising on trend), and many countries took one-off 
measures to squeeze their deficit ratios to the required levels. National 
considerations seemed to play a very important role in the selection of the first 
ECB president.
In addition to being sceptical about the durability of EMU and the ECB’s 
independence from political influence, many market participants have 
difficulties understanding the ECB’s monetary policy strategy. The ECB is the 
only major supra-national central bank existing and it has to struggle with a poor 
data base as well uncertainty about the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy and the stability of the demand for money. Reflecting these uncertainties 
but also the belief that in the end "money matters", it has opted to pursue its goal 
of price stability by analysing risks to price stability using a wide set of 
indicators and by observing a reference value for the growth of the broad money 
stock (M3). Thus, the ECB’s strategy differs from the now well established 
approach of inflation targeting, as for instance followed by the Bank of England, 
in that the ECB does not adjust interest rates in order to bring forecast inflation 
in line with its inflation objective. It also differs from that of the Bundesbank, 
which in the past at least claimed that it would adjust interest rates in response to 
deviations of money growth from its target value (though in reality they did not 
do so). The ECB refuses any thought of reacting mechanically to variations of 
money growth and emphasises the need to place monetary developments into 
context. Last but not least, in order to avoid even the appearance of any political 
considerations entering the thinking of its Council members, it has opted to 
summarise the proceedings of its meetings in press statements by the President 
without showing the voting record of Council members.
The ECB understands its strategy to be unique, given the rather 
exceptional circumstances in which it has to conduct monetary policy. For 
market participants, however, the ECB’s unique strategy is difficult to 
understand, and hence suspicious. The lack of understanding is often visible in 
the criticism raised against the ECB’s strategy. UK media, notably the Financial 
Times, tend to criticise the ECB because of its reluctance to come up with a 
numerical inflation forecast. As a result of that and because of the ECB’s refusal 
to publish minutes similar to those of the Bank of England, so the argument 
goes, the ECB’s conduct of monetary policy lacks transparency. Other observers, 
mainly in Germany, criticise the ECB for not linking its policy decisions more 




























































































Not every successful central bank has had a clear monetary policy 
strategy and a transparent decision making system. The Bundesbank, for 
instance, was renown for its secretiveness (with minutes of Council meetings 
published only after 30 years) and, contrary' to the Bank’s explicit statements, 
only few believed that the Bundesbank indeed should and was following a 
monetary target. Moreover, the Federal Reserve Board under Chairman 
Greenspan is widely seen to follow an opaque approach of looking at everything 
deemed important by the Chairman and then using a high degree of discretion 
when making a decision. Nevertheless, these institutions have benefited from a 
high degree of credibility among market participants - which has led to low risk 
premia on assets denominated in their currencies - thanks to their impressive 
track record as inflation fighters. The ECB, however, lacks a track record that 
could make up for apparent flaws in its monetary policy strategy.
A direct implication of these observations is that European central 
bankers should take no risk with inflation in the First few years of EMU. After 
having established an impeccable track record, credibility can be expected to 
rise and risk premia on euro assets to fall. However, this may take a few years. 
In the meantime, it is worth pursuing the question whether the ECB cannot 
reduce the risk premium at a faster pace by helping market participants to 
understand its strategy better.
A MODIFIED TAYLOR RULE AS A PROXY FOR THE ECB’S 
STRATEGY
Over recent years, the so-called Taylor rule - a normative interest rate rule for 
central banks developed by Professor John Taylor of Stanford University - has 
become a standard instrument in financial markets for analysing central bank 
behaviour. Because of its simplicity it is easily understood by financial market 
participants, and because of its (unintentional) ability to explain past behaviour 
of the Federal Reserve and the Bundesbank, it is widely accepted as a 
framework for monetary policy analysis. In the following we argue that the 
Taylor mie can also be used as a reasonable approximation for the interest rate 
implications of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy.1 Hence, monetary policy 
analysis using this mie can help to facilitate the understanding of the ECB’s 
actions.
1 The relationship between a money supply and an interest rate rule was recently highlighted 
by John B. Taylor, "The Robustness and Efficiency of Monetary Policy Rules as Guidelines 
for Interest Rate Setting by the European Central Bank." Mimeo February 1999, and J. 




























































































According to Taylor, the appropriate short-term interest rate is given by 
the following equation:
(1) i = rer + ie + 0.5 [(dp-dpt) + (y-y*)]
with i denoting the appropriate short-term rate, rer the equilibrium real short­
term rate, ie the expected inflation rate, dp the actual inflation rate (here in 
logarithmic differences of the price level), dpt the inflation target, y actual GDP 
growth (expressed in log differences of real GDP), and y* potential GDP growth 
(with the expression (y-y*) generally referred to as the output gap). The 
coefficient of 0.5 in the formula is supposed to reflect an equal weighting by the 
central bank of deviations of inflation from its target and of actual GDP from the 
full employment level in its interest rate decisions.
The term in square brackets in equation (1) can be seen as a reasonable 
approximation of the ECB’s first pillar of its monetary policy strategy, which 
consists of an analysis of the risks to price stability. This analysis includes a 
review of past and prospective inflation developments relative to the target rate 
as well as of output developments compared to some underlying growth rate. 
With inflation exceeding the target and output growth rising above its longer-run 
sustainable trend, it must be presumed that inflation risks have reached a critical 
level, justifying an interest rate hike.
But is there a way to bring the second part, the analysis of the money 
growth relative to a reference value, into equation (1)? Recall that the quantity 
theory of money equates nominal GDP to the stock of money times its velocity. 
From this simple equation, the so-called P-Star model has been derived, which 
relates the long-run price level (P*) to real potential GDP (Y*), long-term 
velocity (V*), and the stock of money (M).2 In logarithmic changes:
(2) p* = m + v* - y*
where lower case letter denote log changes of variables.
Typically, the velocity of money rises with increases in interest rates 
(because of higher opportunity costs of holding money). Hence, assume that
2 This model assumes that the money stock determines the price level in the long run, an 
assumption not generally accepted by the economics profession. We do not want to add to the 
debate about the causality between money and prices in the present paper. All we are 
interested in is to find a more concise way of expressing the ECB’s monetary policy strategy. 





























































































changes in v* are a positive function of the real equilibrium rate rer and 
expected inflation, given by p*:
(3) v* = a (rer + p*)
Substituting (3) in (2) and rearranging gives:
(4) p* = [1/(1 -a)] m + [a/( 1 -a)] r e r -  [1/(1 -a)] y*
Assuming that expected inflation ie can be represented by the change in 
the long-run price level p* and substituting (4) in (1) gives:
(5) i = [1 + a/( 1 -a)] rer + [1/(1-a)] (m-y*) + 0.5 [(p -  pt) + (y -  y*)]
Thus, for any given equilibrium real rate rer, the interest rate i rises when 
the gap between money growth and potential GDP (m-y*) rises, the difference 
between actual and target inflation (p-pt) grows, or the output gap (y-y*) 
increases. The first term (m-y*) can be interpreted as the ECB's monetarist pillar 
in its strategy: an increase in money growth relative to potential GDP growth 
raises expected inflation and hence tilts the central bank towards an interest rate 
increase (whereby the strength of the interest rate response depends on the 
sensitivity of velocity to interest rate changes). The second and third terms 
represent the direct inflation targeting pillar in the strategy as it is presently 
practised: an observed rise of actual inflation relative to the target or of actual 
GDP relative to potential induces the ECB to consider an increase in its interest 
rate.3
For equation (5) to make sense, the parameter a should be positive and 
less than one. However, this does not represent and implausible restriction. A 
negative value of a would imply that long-run velocity falls with rising interest 
rates, which is against all theoretical and empirical insights. A value of zero 
would imply that v* is constant and coefficients of both rer and (m-y*) in 
equation (5) would be one. Finally, if a would be equal to one, changes in 
expected prices p* and velocity would become identical, and equation (2) would 
no longer be able to give a solution for expected inflation.
3 The "inflation" and the "output" gap are not independent: a fall in the output gap can be 
expected to raise inflationary pressures after some time. However, both the Taylor formula as 
well as the ECB’s discussion of risks to price stability focus on developments of the real 




























































































WHAT DOES THE TAYLOR RULE SUGGEST?
In the previous section we have argued that the Taylor formula can 
accommodate monetarist and non-monetarist elements in a central banks’ 
monetary policy strategy. This is perhaps the reason why this formula has been 
so successful in explaining the behaviour of so different central banks as the US 
Federal Reserve and the German Bundesbank. In the following, we pursue the 
question of whether the Taylor formula is also capable of explaining the 
development of aggregate Euroland short-term rates in the past, and what can be 
learned from the formula for the interest rate outlook.4
In order to simplify matters, we go back to equation (1) to calculate a 
series of Taylor rates for Euroland. Although this version of Taylor’s rule is 
simple and appealing, its application to Euroland is not entirely straightforward. 
Obtaining data for expected inflation and the output gap is a relatively easy task: 
Following conventional practice, we can use actual inflation as a proxy for the 
former and OECD estimates for the latter, with both series for Euroland 
calculated as a GDP weighted average of national data. Moreover, since most 
Euroland central banks other than the Bundesbank have in fact targeted their 
exchange rate versus the D-Mark during the 1980s and 1990s, we may use the 
Bundesbank’s inflation objective as the inflation target variable for the period 
until 1999 and the ECB’s inflation target thereafter.
More difficult, however, is the determination of the equilibrium real 
interest rate. In Taylor’s formula this rate is assumed to be constant and general 
practice has been to calculate it from historical averages for short-term interest 
and inflation rates. But past experience has shown that results can vary 
significantly depending on the time period chosen for the calculation as 
monetary policy regimes in many countries have not been entirely stable over 
time. In the case of Euroland, a change in the real equilibrium rate almost 
certainly occurred when national monetary policies were merged into a 
European policy. Hence, the question is not whether but how the real rate has 
been affected by the regime change.
In a recent paper, Gerlach and Schnabel assumed that the real equilibrium 
rate in Euroland was lowered by an increase in the credibility of monetary 
policy in those countries, whose currency in the past depreciated against the D- 
Mark. In order to eliminate exchange rate risk premia, they regressed the 
average real short-term interest rate for 1982-97 for 13 European countries on a 
constant and the average depreciation of these countries’ currencies against the 
D-Mark during this period. They then defined the "credibility adjusted"
4 See also Gert Peersman and Frank Smets, "Uncertainty and the Taylor Rule in a Simple 




























































































equilibrium real rate as the fitted value of this regression, assuming no 
depreciation against the D-Mark. In their univariate cross-country regression this 
is simply the constant, equal to 3.55%.5
However, while correction of the historical rate averages is certainly 
necessary, the approach of the BIS economists is not entirely convincing for two 
reasons: First, they adjust historical real interest rate data only for the effects of 
exchange rate changes and hence may miss other effects of the monetary regime 
shift. Second, their real equilibrium exchange rate is the arithmetic average of 
country averages corrected for exchange rate effects, giving equal weight to 
small and large countries in their sample. However, the behaviour of the ECB so 
far has indicated that they weigh the information from individual countries by 
the countries’economic size.
In view of these difficulties, we have chosen a different approach to the 
calculation of the real equilibrium interest rate. First, we assumed that the ECB 
so far has set actual interest rates correctly for 1999 and that no further rate 
changes this year are required (though at the time of writing in October 1999 the 
ECB was clearly considering a rate hike). This assumption appeared reasonable 
as there were no inflationary pressures visible that would require a correction of 
the ECB’s rate cut from April 8 in 1999. Second, based on our estimates of the 
output gap and the difference between actual and targeted inflation for 1999, we 
calculated an equilibrium real interest rate that equates the Taylor rate to actual 
short-term rates in 1999. The rate satisfying this requirement was 2.25%. Third, 
using this real equilibrium rate we calculated Taylor rates for past years and 
2000, using estimated and projected output gap and inflation data. The result of 
this exercise is given in the accompanying chart.
As already noted by the Gerlach and Schnabel, the Taylor rate series exhibits a 
fairly good fit to the actual interest rates, with changes of the latter generally
5 Stefan Gerlach and Gert Schnabel, "The Taylor Rule and Interest Rates in the EMU Area: A 




























































































foreshadowed by the former. Hence, it seems appropriate to use the Taylor 
formula also to come up with projections for future rates. However, with an 
implied real equilibrium interest rate of 2.25% compared to an historical average 
of 3.7% during 1978-98, Taylor rates were systematically below actual rates 
during 1984-98. At first glance, this may raise doubts about our estimate of the 
real rate, but it is exactly what we should expect. In the run-up to EMU. interest 
rates converged in a non-inflationary environment to the bottom of the range, 
indicating a rise in the credibility of monetary policy in the Euroland average as 
of 1999. By contrast, if we took the historical average of actual real rates in 
1978-98 of 3.7% as the real equilibrium rate, the entire Taylor rate series would 
be shifted upwards by almost 150 basis points. The Taylor rates would be 
significantly above actual rates as of 1996. indicating that monetary policy was 
far too loose in 1996-99. By the same token, if we based our calculation of a real 
equilibrium rate on 3.55%, as suggested by the BIS paper, the Taylor rate series 
would be shifted up by 130 basis points, with the Taylor rates again above actual 
rates as of 1996. Since there are no indications of a need for an immediate hike 
in interest rates by 130-150 basis points, neither approach seems sensible.
If we accept that short-term interest rates at present are broadly 
appropriate, the Taylor formula suggests that any change in the future depends 
on likely movements of the output gap and inflation. For the former, we have 
taken OECD projections of a decline by about 0.25% of GDP (consistent with 
moderate GDP growth of around 2.5%); for the latter, we forecast a moderate 
increase to 1.4% from 1.1% this year.6 With the inflation objective assumed to 
remain at 1%, the Taylor rate for 3-month money rises by about 0.6 percentage 
point to 3.3% in 2000 on average. Risks to an interest rate forecast based on the 
above calculation of a Taylor rate could come from three sides: We may have 
erred in our estimate of the real equilibrium rate, and we may be wrong in our 
forecasts for the output gap or inflation.
Given the structural break in the monetary regime of the euro-zone 
countries at the beginning of the year, the risk of having incorrectly estimated 
the real equilibrium rate and expected inflation is probably highest. In particular, 
recent strong money growth could prove temporary - in which case it should be 
ignored - or it could raise medium-term expected inflation - in which case the 
ECB should tighten. At present, it is impossible to have a more precise view on 
this question, and hence both the real equilibrium rate and the expected inflation 
rate. The risks emanating from errors in the forecasts for the output gap or short­
term inflation are important, but perhaps a little better to control.
6 We can rationalise this forecast as follows: Money growth may well exceed its inflation- 
neutral level by \'U% this year, raising the long-run price level by the same amount. 
Assuming that it will take about 4 years until the effects are fully absorbed, annual inflation 




























































































CONSISTENCY AND CLARITY VS. NERVOUSNESS AND 
CONFUSION
The experience of the first nine months of this year suggests that in order to gain 
credibility quickly the ECB should take no risk with inflation and reinforce 
efforts to explain its strategy clearly and simply. However, market participants’ 
impression in October 1999 - which can be inferred from the yield curve and 
Euribor futures contracts - is that the ECB is nervous and confused.
An impression of confusion is created by the apparently highly 
discretionary use of economic indicators and arguments to justify past or 
pending rate moves. For instance, in order to explain their concerns about the 
medium-term risks to price stability, the ECB has recently frequently referred to 
money and credit growth. In its October Monthly Report, it concluded that "all 
in all, in line with the medium-term orientation of the Eurosystem’s monetary 
policy, both the rising trend in M3 and high credit growth call for great vigilance 
on the part of monetary policy at a time of accelerating economic activity." 
(p.6). It is difficult to reconcile this assessment with the ECB’s focus on a 
reference value for money growth. Since the beginning of this year, money 
growth has fluctuated between 5.0% and 5.8%, 0.5 to 1.3 percentage points 
above the 4.5% reference value. In the past, the Bundesbank set fluctuation 
margins around its money target, which often were as high as 1.5 percentage 
points. As long as money growth remained in the range, the Bundesbank was 
not especially concerned. The ECB chose a reference value and not a target 
coupled with a target range for money growth because it felt that there may be a 
looser relationship in the first few years of EMU between money growth and 
inflation than existed in Germany in the past (see January Monthly Report). 
However, their attitude towards money growth expressed in the October 
Monthly Report suggests that the reference value is interpreted even more 
rigidly than the Bundesbank interpreted its targets.
Moreover, the reference to private sector credit growth along with money 
growth seems inconsistent with any monetarist policy approach. If it is indeed 
money growth that influences price inflation, credit growth is only relevant to 
the extent that it affects money growth. Thus, the ECB’s emphasis on credit 
growth as a key variable to be monitored adds to confusion.
An impression of nervousness is created by the ECB’s inclination to base 
moves on fairly thin fundamental developments. Before the April rate cut, the 
ECB publicly stated that there was no risk of deflation and that monetary policy 
was not the appropriate instrument to revive a sluggish real economy. Following 
the cut, the view gained strength that in reality ECB Council members had 




























































































reduction was motivated by the desire to hedge against a perceived small risk of 
deflation. In July of this year, the ECB begun preparing an interest rate increase. 
However. ECB analyses have not pointed to a significant risk that consumer 
price inflation will exceed the 2% mark in the foreseeable future. Hence, again 
the ECB seems to want to hedge against only a small risk that inflation exceeds 
the 2% mark by an interest rate adjustment. By moving early and decisively in 
either direction, the ECB wants to avoid being seen making mistakes that could 
jeopardise their desire to quickly build credibility in financial markets. This is 
legitimate and understandable. But there is a fine line between a forward looking 
monetary policy and a nervous reaction to perceived risks. For the time being, 
the ECB gives the appearance as if they would do the latter.
CONCLUSIONS
In view of the tasks the ECB has been called upon to perform, the conduct of 
monetary policy in the first year of EMU has been fairly successful. The new 
monetary regime was introduced smoothly and the ECB has not made gross 
mistakes. However, it has failed so far to gain the confidence of financial market 
participants. Much more time will be needed before financial markets will trust 
the ECB as they have trusted the Bundesbank. Until then, we may have to get 
used to a somewhat larger risk premium on Euroland financial assets. The ECB 
can help to reduce this risk premium by patiently explaining its strategy, 
avoiding hectic interest rate moves, and, above all, establishing an impressive 
stability track record.
Thomas Mayer 
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